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AMBIGUOUS-PURPOSE STATEMENTS OF CHILDREN AND OTHER VICTIMS OF ABUSE 
UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Paul F. Rothstein1 
Introduction 
With the passing of Professor Myrna Raeder, the world has lost one of its most able, 
vigorous, and beloved advocates for the rights of women and children in legal proceedings2—an 
advocate who was at the same time alive to the fair-trial rights of criminal defendants.3 
 It is fitting at this conference honoring Prof. Raeder that we examine one of her chief 
interests as a teacher of Evidence and Criminal Procedure: the admissibility under the U.S. 
Constitutional Confrontation Clause of out-of-court statements of abused women and children 
about their abuse.4 
1  Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ., Wash., D.C., specializing in Evidence, Torts, and other subjects concerning civil, criminal, and 
constitutional judicial process from the Supreme Court on down. Among his most recent publications are the books “Federal Testimonial Privileges” 
(West, 2014-15 ed.) (with Susan Crump), "Evidence: Cases, Materials & Problems" (LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2013) (with Myrna Raeder & David 
Crump), “Evidence in a Nutshell” (West, 6th Ed. 2012) (with Myrna Raeder & David Crump), “Federal Rules of Evidence” (West, 2014-15 ed.), 
and numerous law journal articles. He has taught legal and governmental ethics, authored amicus briefs in such cases as Upjohn (the leading case 
on attorney-client privilege) and Daubert (the leading case on scientific evidence), both in the U.S. Supreme Court, and has served on a number of 
editorial boards including the Law Publications Advisory Board of LexisNexis and on the board of contributors to Black’s Law Dictionary.  
  A former Oxford University Fulbright Scholar, Law Review Editor-in-Chief,  Wash., D.C. trial and appellate practitioner, and federal 
public defender, he has been special counsel or consultant to the Judiciary Committees of both Houses of Congress (in drafting the Federal Rules 
of Evidence and the Federal Crime Victims Compensation Act and revising the entire Federal Criminal Code, substantive and sentencing), the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (drafting the Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act and revising the Uniform 
Rules of Evidence), the National Academy of Sciences (study panels on both voiceprint evidence and new airport security technology), the Federal 
Judicial Center (training federal judges and contributing to and peer-reviewing the Center's Scientific Evidence Manual), the National Judicial 
College (training state judges), Rand, Carnegie, Brookings and the American Enterprise Institute (all on mass civil lawsuits, science in court, and 
Daubert), federal agencies including the U.S. Department of Justice (inter alia training Justice Department trial attorneys), and (principally on 
constitutional, judicial, evidentiary or criminal law reform) the Governments of, among others, Canada, the Philippines, and over a dozen nations 
emerging from the former Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Hungary, Kazakhstan, and others). He has helped draft the constitutions of 
several of these countries, including the current constitution of Russia; and assisted nations like Macedonia and Mongolia on matters such as 
criminal law and procedural reform needed to combat domestic violence.  
  He has also assisted several U.S. state governments (on civil, criminal, judicial, and evidentiary reform), federal agencies (inter alia 
training Federal Trade Commission trial attorneys), bar associations including the American Bar Association and the Federal Bar Association 
(concerning U.S. Supreme Court and other judicial nominations, continuing legal education, and various substantive legal matters), and some of 
the nation's most prominent Washington law firms (training their trial attorneys, and various substantive legal matters).  
  In addition to holding leadership positions in the American Bar Association and Federal Bar Association, he chaired the Association of 
American Law Schools Evidence Section and an American Bar Association committee monitoring developments under the Federal and Uniform 
Rules of Evidence, suggesting changes to the Rules, a number of which have been made. His series of national conferences on the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, and his accompanying book, the first on the Rules, are credited with introducing the bench, bar, and much of academia to what they 
would be facing under the new Rules.  
  Rothstein is also noted for his appearances in the print, radio, television, and digital media. He is listed in a number of international and 
national scholarly and professional directories as well as in “Who’s Who” (worldwide), “Who’s Who in America,” and “Who’s Who in American 
Education.” He is a lifetime member of the Oxford University and Oxford Union Societies. 
 
2 I feel a very special personal sense of sorrow because Prof. Raeder was my good friend and also a deeply valued 
colleague on an ABA committee I chaired, a brilliant co-author of mine on two books, and, as a student, she was an 
outstanding fellow in Georgetown Law’s E. Barrett Prettyman clinic for criminal trial advocacy. 
3 See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: Ohio’s Efforts to Protect Children Without 
Eviscerating the Rights of Criminal Defendants—Evidentiary Considerations and the Rebirth of Confrontation 
Clause Analysis in Child Abuse Cases, 25 U. Tol. L. Rev. 43 (1994).  
4 See, Myrna S. Raeder, the following articles: White’s Effect on the Right to Confront One’s Accuser [1993 7-WTR] 
Crim. Just. 2; Domestic Violence Cases After Davis: Is the Glass half Empty or Half Full?, 15 J. L. & Pol’y 759 (2007); 
Domestic Violence,  Child Abuse, and Trustworthiness Exceptions After Crawford, [2005 20-SUM] Crim. Just. 24; 
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In the last few weeks this topic has taken center stage even more than usual, because the 
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case of Ohio v. Clark,5 in which a very 
young child made statements to a pre-school teacher6 about his physical injuries, implicating the 
defendant as his abuser. The child was considered incompetent to testify in person.7 Over a 
strong dissent, the state court held it error under the U.S. Confrontation Clause to admit the 
child’s out-of-court statement against the defendant in his criminal trial for the abuse because the 
teacher, under a statutory duty to report abuse, was therefore an agent of law enforcement and 
the primary purpose of the exchange with the child, objectively viewed, was to obtain evidence 
that could be used prosecutorialy (although there may have been other subordinate purposes and 
functions of the  teacher as well). This, the state court said, made the statement “testimonial” and 
therefore inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. Certiorari was granted to resolve whether 
the teacher could be regarded as an agent of the state for these purposes (if that is significant) and 
whether the Confrontation Clause rendered the statement inadmissible. The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision on the merits—expected by June this year--hopefully will clear up some of the 
uncertainty in Supreme Court jurisprudence about whether these, and similar ambiguous-purpose 
statements are inadmissible evidence under the Confrontation Clause.  
I will examine in this paper two kinds of ambiguous-purpose out-of-court statements that 
are especially problematic under current Confrontation law--problematic in ways that we hope 
will be solved directly or indirectly by the Supreme Court when it renders its decision in Ohio v. 
Clark.8 The statements I will examine are: 
(1) Statements made by abused children concerning their abuse, for example to police, 
physicians, teachers,  welfare workers, baby sitters, or family members, some of whom may be 
Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a Testimonial World: The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and 
Confrontation, 82 Ind. L.J. 1009 (2007); Enhancing the Legal Profession’s Response to Victims of Child Abuse, [2009 
24-SPG] Crim. Just. 12; Remember the Ladies and the Children Too, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 311 (2005); Distrusting Young 
Children Who Allege Sexual Abuse: Why Stereotypes Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child Testimony, 16 Widener 
L. Rev. 239 (2010). 
5 __S.Ct.__, 2014 WL 1882769 (2014). 
6 Presumably the school was a private school. EDITORS: PLEASE CHECK THIS. I believe it was a governmentally 
sponsored head-start program. This could make a difference to the state-actor analysis but probably should not. 
7 That the child was incompetent to take the stand yet competent enough to make the hearsay statements, 
qualifying for a special state child hearsay exception seems odd to many, but it is frequent in these cases. It is well 
accepted that a young child’s inability to function with dependable reliability in a courtroom is different than 
making statements outside of court that may have certain other indicia of reliability operable at the time. See 
Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a Testimonial World: The Intersection of Competency, 
Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 Ind. L.J. 1009 (2007). 
 
8 There are of course other ambiguous-purpose statements that are problematic under the Confrontation 
Clause which I will not address in this paper. See, for example, Marc D. Ginsberg, Confrontation Clause 
and Forensic Autopsy Reports - A “Testimonial,” 74 LA. L. REV. 117 (2013); Daniel J. Capra, Autopsy 
Reports and the Confrontation Clause:  A Presumption of Admissibility, 2 VA. J. CRIM. L. 62 (2014); 
Jessica Berch, Confrontation Clause and the Border Patrol: Applying the Primary Purpose Test to 
Multifunction Agencies, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 793 (2013). 
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under a legal duty to report suspected abuse to legal authorities.9 At least some of these 
statements will be directly addressed by the Court in Ohio v. Clark. 
(2) Statements made by adult victims of sexual assaults to specially trained medical 
personnel (sometimes known as S.A.N.E. nurses or members of D.O.V.E. hospital units, or 
S.A.R.T. units10) whose task is simultaneously to medically treat the victim and to gather or 
preserve evidence for a legal case or investigation. These statements may be inferentially address 
by the Court in Ohio v. Clark. 
U.S. Supreme Court Confrontation-Clause jurisprudence stemming from Crawford v. 
Washington (2004) holds that when a declarant (like the child or adult victim here) does not 
testify, 11 her out-of-court statement’s admissibility against the alleged perpetrator in a criminal 
case is normally determined by what the “primary purpose” was when the statement was made, 
at least if it was made to law enforcement or its affiliates.12 If that “primary purpose” was 
prosecutorial or evidentiary the statement will ordinarily be inadmissible. If the purpose was 
something else—for example a primarily medical or treative purpose or a relatively immediate 
protective purpose or to deal with an on-going emergency—the statement is normally admissible 
insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned. 
The main problem with the victims’ and children’s statements identified above, is the 
difficulty in determining their “primary purpose.” Is it medical? Legal? Protective? Is it 
responding to an emergency? A related problem is whether the person to whom the statement 
was made had a substantial enough connection to law enforcement or government (if such 
connection is an independent requirement for there to be a Confrontation issue13).  A subsidiary 
9 See, e.g., Children as Witnesses: A Symposium on Child Competence and the Accused’s Right to Confront Child 
Witnesses, 82 Ind. L.J. 909 (2007). The entire symposium is very worthwhile. The introduction by Prof. Aviva 
Orenstein gives an excellent overview. Of special pertinence here are the articles by Profs. Raeder and Mosteller. 
See also Out-of-Court Statements by Victims of Child Sexual Abuse to Multidisciplinary Teams: A Confrontation 
Clause Analysis, 47 Fam. Ct. Rev. 167 (2009). 
10 The acronyms are for “Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners” and “Developing Options for Violent Emergency” units. 
Sometimes the acronym S.A.R.T. (sexual assault response team) is used which may connote a more formal 
connection to the police. 
11 There are a number of reasons why the victims frequently don’t testify in these cases, including, among  others, 
loyalty, fear, or death (from the abuse or from independent causes), under circumstances that do not qualify as 
waiver of confrontation rights under Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), nor render the statement a dying 
declaration (which Crawford suggests may be a sui generis exception to the confrontation clause); or to be spared 
a damaging public spectacle; or because of incompetence to testify at trial (as, e.g., where a child is declared 
incompetent for reasons peculiar to the trial process that do not infect the child’s off-the-stand statement).  A few 
cases by analogy to the notice-and-demand procedure seemingly approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in dicta in 
Melendez-Diaz (infra) have treated as waiver of confrontation rights by defendant, a situation where the victim is 
present in the courtroom and the defendant does not call the victim to the witness stand. See, e.g., Trevizo v. 
State, __S.W. 3d (2014), 2014 WL 260591. 
 
12If the declarant is genuinely unavailable for trial, the Clause may be satisfied if there was an 
equivalent opportunity for cross examination at some earlier time.  
13 Alternatively, a connection to law enforcement might not be an absolute or independent requirement, but just a 
factor to consider in deciding the purpose of the exchange. There is also authority that, although a law 
enforcement connection is not required, the purpose test to be applied under the Confrontation Clause is different 
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question is whether there has to be anything like a questioning or interrogation—or some kind of 
formality attending the taking of the statement--in order for the Confrontation Clause to be 
applicable.14 
 The Supreme Court’s Ambiguous Confrontation-Clause Jurisprudence  
 The Crawford Case: Setting a New Approach 
Ohio v. Roberts15 governed Confrontation Clause analysis from 1980 to 2004. In 2004, 
Crawford v. Washington16 overruled it. In Roberts part of the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing was offered at defendant’s state criminal trial.  That transcript portion contained 
testimony of a witness who did not appear at the trial. This was, of course, hearsay, but arguably 
within a hearsay exception. Roberts, as elucidated by subsequent cases interpreting it17, 
essentially held that before hearsay statements could be deemed admissible under the 
Confrontation Clause, they must, if the declarant does not take the stand, be deemed reliable, 
which meant they must come within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception or be found reliable on 
the particular facts. Alternatively, the Confrontation requirement could be satisfied if the 
declarant was sufficiently unavailable at trial and there was an adequate opportunity to cross 
examine her earlier.  
  Crawford overturned this Roberts approach. In Crawford, police were investigating a 
stabbing by Mr. Crawford of an acquaintance. Mrs. Crawford was interrogated and tape-recorded 
by police about the stabbing. Her statements were somewhat inconsistent with her husband’s 
story of self-defense. She did not testify at trial because of marital privilege. The prosecution 
introduced into evidence the tape-recording of her statements to the police under the declarations 
against interest hearsay exception and Mr. Crawford was convicted. The U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the introduction of Mrs. Crawford’s statement violated the Confrontation Clause. In the 
course of so ruling, the Court launched a totally new approach to the Confrontation Clause.  
Under Crawford the Confrontation Clause no longer tracks the hearsay exceptions nor 
allows hearsay that is otherwise found reliable. Reliability is repudiated as the criterion. Instead,  
out-of-court statements the Court would deem “testimonial’’ are inadmissible if there is no 
opportunity at the trial for defendant to cross examine the declarant. If the declarant is 
unavailable then, the statement would be admissible if there was a previous opportunity for such 
cross examination18.   
depending on whether the person to whom the statement was made had such a connection. See the dissent in 
State v. Clark (the state decision for which certiorari was just granted by the U.S. Supreme Court). 
14 Conceivably, this too could be just a factor in determining purpose, and not an independent requirement. 
15 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
16 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
17 E.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
18 As case-law develops under Crawford, issues will surface concerning what kind of former opportunity 
to cross-examine is sufficient for these purposes. Will there be a “similar motive” requirement as there 
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In deciding what statements are “testimonial,” the effort--as described by Justice Scalia 
writing for the Court in Crawford--is to identify out-of-court statements of a kind that were 
specially disapproved in England in the period preceding the adoption of the U.S. Confrontation 
Clause. Such statements included the statements taken, and later used at trial, by prosecutors in 
the Sir Walter Raleigh case, without confronting Raleigh with them.19  The Crawford opinion 
specifically mentions, among others included in the “testimonial” class, officially obtained 
statements like grand jury statements, affidavits, recorded testimony at previous proceedings, and 
statements taken in police investigations.  But exactly what other statements might be deemed 
“testimonial” is left vague. The Court expressly states that a fuller definition of “testimonial” 
will emerge in future cases.  
But there is some general language in Crawford pertinent to what the Court had in mind. 
Although it is not exactly clear, the Court suggests “testimonial’’ may have something to do with 
whether government was involved in obtaining the statement. With what subjective or 
objectively determined purpose, and on whose part, is left unclear:  
[T]he Confrontation Clause . . . applies to “witnesses” against the accused--in other words, 
those who ‘bear testimony.’ ‘Testimony,’ in turn, is typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’  An accuser who 
makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person 
who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.... [An] “off-hand, overheard 
remark might be unreliable evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay 
rules [but not under the  Confrontation Clause].” 20 
 Testimoniality clearly was linked to purpose, but exactly whose purpose and how it is 
linked were not precisely described. The statement may be testimonial if declarant or possibly 
the questioner knew, or perhaps a reasonable person would have known, that the statement could 
be used in a prosecution:  
[Testimonial statements include] ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent--
that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the 
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would 
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially. . .extrajudicial statements . . . contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions, . . . and statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
is under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (the former testimony hearsay exception) and will it be defined the same 
way? Will there be a same-party or similar-party requirement? 
19 Raleigh was convicted of treason based on an out-of-court affidavit by Lord Cobham given to 
authorities, which affidavit incriminated Raleigh. Cobham subsequently repudiated the statement and 
professed he would have done so if he been called to the stand as a witness.  
 
20 Crawford  at 51 (citing Webster’s Dictionary (1828)). 
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objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial. 21 
 The court hints without clearly holding, that an important—or perhaps even 
indispensable--factor may be whether the statement was made in a formal police proceeding, or 
in formal materials like depositions or affidavits. It is uncertain whether this has independent 
significance, or is important only as it indicates purpose. Crawford could afford to be non-
definitive on all these matters because Mrs. Crawford’s recorded statement was clearly 
“testimonial’’ on any version of any of the criteria mentioned. 
Thus, under Crawford factors to consider in the “testimoniality” determination might 
include all of the following: 
(a) Purpose.  
 
(b) Government or law enforcement involvement.22  
 
(c) Formality or solemnity to the proceeding.23   
 
 (d) That the statement was made under some kind of interrogation or   
 questioning.24  
Mrs. Crawford’s statement qualified under all of them. Problems occur in interpreting what they 
mean in less clear cases.25 
 
The Davis Case: The Primary Purpose Test and the Emergency Doctrine 
21 Crawford at 51-52 (emphasis supplied; internal quotation marks deleted). 
 
22 This may or may not have significance beyond how it reflects on purpose. 
23 Justice Sotomayor's opinion for five members of the Court subsequently in Bryant (infra) interpreting 
Crawford,  hints that this factor may only be significant as one of the circumstances indicating that the 
purpose was probably to provide evidence (a testimonial purpose). 
24 The Court in the subsequent Davis case, infra, interpreting Crawford, says, in dictum, "volunteered 
testimony"  can still be subject to the Confrontation Clause.  
25 Cf. Anthony Michael Sabino, Confronting the Crucible of Cross-Examination: Reconciling the Supreme 
Court's Recent Edicts on the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, 65 BAYLOR L. REV. 255 (2013); 
Josephine Ross, What's Reliability Got to Do With the Confrontation Clause after Crawford, 14 WIDENER L. 
REV. 383 (2009). 
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Two years after Crawford, the Supreme Court shed a little more light on the purpose 
factor and created what some call an emergency exception to the confrontation right. The case 
was Davis v. Washington.26    
The Davis decision actually combined two cases decided by the Court simultaneously. In 
one, the Court held that the statements of a domestic violence victim--made in a 911 call by the 
victim during a physical altercation with her domestic partner--were non-testimonial because the 
primary purpose was to get help in or resolve an on-going emergency.27  In the other, a statement 
made to police on the scene by a victim immediately after a domestic violence attack was held 
testimonial because the attack was finished and the attacker was isolated in an adjoining room 
when the statement was taken (and reduced to writing in the form of an affidavit) all in relative 
calmness. Thus the “primary purpose” was to gather evidence of past fact for use in a 
prosecution—as a potential “stand in” for trial testimony. Any emergency had already 
terminated.28 Unlike the 911 operator/dispatcher, the officers in this instance were trying to 
establish what had happened rather than what was currently happening.29  “[It was] entirely clear 
from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal 
past conduct [rather than a response to an ongoing emergency]”.30 
Davis held that the inquiry under Crawford is into what was the “primary purpose” of the 
exchange.  If the primary purpose, objectively viewed, was to gather evidence of past fact for 
potential use in a prosecution, the statement is testimonial: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant 
to later criminal prosecution.31 
26 Citation. 
27 In setting forth this finding, the Court additionally notes that usually 911 calls are designed to relay a current 
situation demanding police assistance, not to establish a past fact, but the opinion expressly also acknowledges 
that someone might call 911 to report  past crime. This latter kind of statement would be excluded as testimonial. 
P. 827 
 
28 P. 830. 
29 P. 831. 
30 P. ___. 
31 Cite Davis page. It is interesting to note a subtle change in this language from the formulation of a similar 
concept in Crawford, at the text accompanying footnote 20, supra. The Crawford quote makes clear that the 
potential relevance to later criminal prosecution must be part of the purpose. The last few lines of the present 
Davis quote do not necessarily say that has to be part of the purpose. Arguably under that language, the only thing 
the purpose needs embrace is “to establish or prove past events.” Then if those events prove to be relevant to 
later criminal prosecution, the statement is testimonial. The language about relevance—that the facts “are 
relevant to later criminal prosecution”--is not something that has to be part of the purpose—just something that is 
true. This is a distinction that arguably have a good deal of significance regarding the victims’ statements we are 
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Quoting New York v. Quarles,32 the Court further observes that police officers  “can and 
will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or 
the safety of the public and questions designed elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.”33 But, 
perhaps in part as an attempt to countermand some of the implications of this, the Court insists 
that the “primary purpose” determination is to be made on a purely objective basis as distinct 
from subjective determinations of interviewer or interviewee intent. 34 
In the course of the decision, the Court said a number of other things pertinent to our 
inquiry, some by way of dicta, some quite ambiguous: 
 
--When the emergency is over, declarant’s further statements about the event may change 
to being testimonial in character.35 
-- "Volunteered testimony" can still be subject to the Confrontation Clause.36  
 
--The 911 operator/dispatcher was acting as an agent of the police. 37 
 
Significantly for our purposes, the Court further notes: 
 
[O]ur holding today makes it unnecessary to consider whether and when statements made 
to someone other than law enforcement personnel are testimonial.38   
 
This suggests the possibility that statements made to private persons could also in certain 
unspecified circumstances be “testimonial” and excludable evidentially. 
 
There was considerable agreement among all the Justices in Davis except that in a partial 
concurrence and partial dissent, Justice Thomas focused on formality. Under his view, formality 
is required for a statement to be testimonial, in a degree not shared by the other Justices.  
 
The Bryant Case: Refining the Primary Purpose Test and  
Extending the Concept of Emergency 
 
Five years later, in 2011, Michigan v. Bryant39 extended the emergency concept coined in 
Davis to include less immediate emergencies. In Bryant a citizen shot and bleeding on the street 
dealing with in this article. It is not clear if the Supreme Court realizes it has said two different things that can have 
different consequences. 
32 CITE 
33 PAGE 
34 Davis at 821, 827 
35 Davis at 828. 
36 Cite page in Davis. 
37 Davis at 825 n.2 
38 Davis at p. ___. 
39 131 S.Ct.___ (2011). Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinion for the court in which Justices Roberts, Kennedy, 
Breyer and Alito joined. Justices Ginsburg and Scalia dissented. Justice Thomas filed a concurrence. Justice Kagan 
recused herself. 
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told police the identity of who had shot him—the defendant—who was still on the loose. The 
Court (per Justice Sotomayor writing for the majority) extended Davis' notion of a primary 
purpose to resolve an on-going emergency, to include as an emergency the necessity of catching 
the shooter,40 since he was at large with a gun and may have presented a continuing danger to the 
public.41  Thus the victim’s statement to police was held not testimonial. 
Justice Scalia, who authored Crawford, dissented from the extension of the emergency 
doctrine in Bryant. He had voted for it in Davis, but argued in Bryant that extension to a broader 
kind of emergency like this eviscerated Crawford and gave the word “emergency” an almost 
unlimited scope. He believed that under Justice Sotomayor’s view of emergency in Bryant, 
almost any criminal situation could be regarded as involving an emergency if the suspect was 
still at large. It is indeed true that Justice Sotomayor expresses the opinion that the emergency 
concept may embrace situations even where shots have not been fired (perhaps foreshadowing 
our situation where a rapist or abuser may be on the loose).42  
The Court in Bryant emphasized that the “primary purpose” of the verbal exchange must 
be determined by an objective analysis: 
The relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved in 
a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, 
as ascertained from the individuals' statements and actions and the circumstances in 
which the encounter occurred.43 
To be considered in determining this “primary purpose” are the objective facts of where 
the exchange occurred, the formality or informality of the questioning, and other factors—that is, 
the totality of the circumstances. The Court expressly relies on the kind of details given to the 
officers by the declarant, the presence of a deadly weapon, the undetermined whereabouts of the 
escaped assailant, and the general informality of the interview. Considerations include (in 
addition to the existence of the emergency) the potential scope of it, the physical condition of the 
declarant (victim), his mental state, and the degree of structure to the interview. 
And, the Court says, just because an on-going emergency existed at the time does not 
necessarily mean the statements were concerned with it and were therefore non-testimonial: 
40 Cf. U.S. v. Liera-Morales, ___F.3d____(9th Cir. July 21 2014)(No. 12-10548) extending the emergency concept to 
a telephone conversation of a mother with the kidnappers of her son which she arranged for law enforcement to 
hear. The phone call was made for the purpose of obtaining her son’s safe release. 
41  Even though the shooting appeared to be caused by a particular grievance against this single victim only. 
42 Bryant 131 S.Ct. ____ at 1163-65. Cf. U.S. v. Liera-Morales, ___F.3d____(9th Cir. July 21 2014)(No. 12-10548) 
extending the emergency concept to a telephone conversation of a mother with the kidnappers of her son which 
she arranged for law enforcement to hear. The phone call was made for the purpose of obtaining her son’s safe 
release. 
43 P. 1156. It  is doubtful that Bryant means that if objectively viewed a statement does not appear to be for a 
prosecutorial, accusatory, incriminatory, evidential  purpose, but secretly in fact is intended for that purpose, that 
this would not be testimonial 
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We reiterate… that the existence vel non of an ongoing emergency is not a touchstone of 
the testimonial inquiry; rather, the ultimate inquiry is whether the primary purpose of the 
interrogation was to enable police assistance to meet the ongoing emergency.44   
The Court makes a big point of the fact that the actions and statements of both the 
interviewer and the interviewee are to be considered when determining the interview’s objective 
primary purpose.45 Perhaps somewhat disingenuously, the opinion goes on to say that this 
approach will take care of the multiple “mixed motives” problems that could arise under the 
majority’s test—dual motives of the victim who may both seek help from the officers and also 
wish to incapacitate the offender, compounded by dual motives of the police who may be 
concerned both with public safety and securing evidence for conviction.46 Nevertheless, while 
professing that the purpose of both participants must be taken into account, the opinion seems to 
at times emphasize the declarant’s intention, rather than that of the interviewer. 47 
The Court acknowledges that while certain sentences in Davis seem to suggest that “the 
relevant purpose is that of the interrogator,” in actuality it is “the declarant’s statements, not the 
interrogator’s questions” that are the subject of the Confrontation Clause scrutiny.48 Somewhat 
confusingly, in the same note, the Court re-iterates that the interviewer’s purpose is also 
pertinent. Justice Scalia in dissent accuses Justice Sotomayor of placing primary emphasis on the 
interrogator’s purpose.  He says that the significant purpose under Crawford (which he wrote) is 
that of the declarant although Crawford did not have to specifically decide that point.49 
 Fostering more confusion for our purposes, is the fact that the opinion equivocates on 
both the question of whether state actors must be  involved for a statement to be testimonial, and 
on the question whether formality and interrogation necessarily need be involved:  
[T]he most important instances in which the Clause restricts the introduction of out-of-
court statements are those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court 
interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial.50   
Although the opinion expressly declines to narrow the purposes that may be considered, 
to include only emergency resolution versus evidence gathering,51 it also says that resolving an 
emergency is among the “most important” things to look at in the primary purpose inquiry:  
44 P. 1165. 
45 Pp. 1156, 1162. 
46 P. 1161 
47 See p. 1160, n.11.   
48 P. 1160 n.11 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
49 Cf. Shari Silver, Michigan v. Bryant: Returning to an Open-Ended Confrontation Clause Analysis, 71 MD. L. REV. 
545, 564 (2012) (Bryant had to cope with contradictory statements in Crawford and Davis on this; declarant’s 
purpose should be the exclusive focus).   
50 P. 1155. 
51 And seems to recognize, for example, that an out of court statement may be made and obtained for the primary 
purpose of diagnosing or treating an illness or injury. The Court also takes pains to confine its emergency versus 
evidence gathering dichotomy to the specific police situations involved in these cases. 
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The existence of an ongoing emergency is relevant to determining the primary purpose of 
the interrogation because an emergency focuses the participants on something other than 
[proving] past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.52  
Of particular importance to our inquiry concerning children, Justice Sotomayor counts as 
a non-testimonial purpose a lack of ability to form any purpose, as perhaps in the case of the 
seriously injured declarant in Bryant.53 
  In a particularly confusing passage, the Court supports its decision by noting the 
reliability of statements made in an emergency like this, mentioning that such reliability is 
responsible for the hearsay exception for excited utterances. The Court continues:  
In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed to 
identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.54  
Apart from a certain illogic to this, it seems to fly in the face of Crawford, which emphatically 
repudiated Roberts’ dependence on reliability and hearsay rules. It does, however, reinforce the 
idea that medical purposes are non-testimonial, because the hearsay exception for statements 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment recognizes such purposes as trustworthy. 
This is quite relevant to the problem of the victims’ statements discussed in this article.   
 Like Davis, Bryant expressly declines to decide when if ever statements to others than 
law enforcement personnel can be testimonial.55 Because the interrogators in all of these cases 
coming to the Court so far were members of the police, the matter has never needed to be 
decided by the Court (at least until the currently pending case of Ohio v. Cark).  This leaves open 
the possibility that such statements can be testimonial.  
Finally, like Crawford and Davis before it, Bryant takes pains to expressly notify us that 
the Court in Bryant is not attempting a complete definition or delineation of the boundaries of 
testimoniality.56  
 
The Williams Case: Introducing the “Targeted Person” Test, the Expert Testimony End-
Run, and the Importance of Formality 
In 2012 the Court decided Williams v. Illinois.57 In that case, a specimen of semen was 
obtained from the person of a rape victim and sent by the Illinois state police laboratory to 
Cellmark Diagnostics, a leading Maryland private laboratory specializing in DNA analysis. 
Cellmark reported back to the Illinois lab the characteristics of the DNA. Meanwhile Mr. 
Williams had become a suspect in the rape. The Illinois state police lab analyzed a blood sample 
from Williams, isolating the characteristics of the DNA in it. In the bench trial of Williams for 
52 P. 1157 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822) (internal quotation marks deleted). 
53 P. ____ 
54 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.   
55 Bryant at 1155 n.3.   
56 Bryant at 1167.  
57 130 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
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the rape, an expert witness from the Illinois state police lab testified that the two sets of 
characteristics (the ones obtained by Cellmark and the ones obtained by the Illinois police lab) 
matched.58 Cellmark personnel did not testify. The victim identified Williams from the stand.  
Williams was convicted and ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court on grounds that Williams’ 
Confrontation Clause rights were violated.59 This was so, he posited, because the Cellmark 
analyst did not testify, yet his out-of-court statements (the Cellmark report) were used against 
Williams.  Williams relied on two previous Supreme Court cases that held that the prosecution’s 
introduction of laboratory reports showing the suspect’s blood alcohol content and the 
composition of narcotic substances seized from the suspect, without introducing as witnesses 
those responsible for the reports, violated the suspects’ rights to confrontation--one of the cases 
also holding that a stand-in expert witness would not do.60  
 Justice Alito announced the judgment of the court in Williams. The analyst’s testimony 
was not required and the conviction was affirmed. Alito wrote the opinion for a plurality of four 
Justices (himself and Justices Roberts, Kennedy, and Breyer). The plurality carried the day 
because a fifth, Justice Thomas, joined in the result but on different grounds.  Justice Breyer also 
filed a concurring opinion suggesting it might be time to re-examine Crawford.  Justice Kagan 
authored a dissent--in which Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor joined--supporting a 
broad reading of Crawford and requiring Cellmark analyst testimony. 
 Justice Alito writing for the plurality first assumes that the Cellmark report was 
testimonial and could not itself have been introduced to establish the truth of what it reported 
without the responsible analyst. But, he says, establishing the report’s truth was not why the 
report was used at the trial. Rather, the report’s content were used more in the nature of a 
58 The testimony was essentially in this form (after the on the stand expert testified to obtaining the vaginal swab 
and sending it to Cellmark, and taking Williams’ blood and doing a DNA analysis on):  
 
 Q. Did you subsequently get a report back from Cellmark concerning what you had sent them? 
 A. Yes. 
 Q. Did it contain a report of DNA characteristics [perhaps specifying types]. 
 A. Yes. [Perhaps specifying the characteristics.] 
 Q.  Did they match the DNA characteristics your lab had obtained from Mr. Wiliams’ blood? 
 A. Yes. [Perhaps going into more detail about the characteristics of both.]  
   
59 For a debate on the issues raised by Williams published just prior to the decision, see Coleman & 
Rothstein, Williams v. Illinois and the Confrontation Clause: Does Testimony by a Surrogate Witness 
Violate the Confrontation Clause?, appearing at http://publicsquare.net/williams-v-illinois-and-the-
confrontation-clause-part-1, and at Georgetown Scholarly Commons, Georgetown Law Faculty 
Publications and Other Works, Paper 740 (2011).] 
 
60 The two previous cases were Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts  557 U.S. 305 (2009) and Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico,  131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). The prosecution in Bullcoming had attempted to get around the holding in 
Melendez-Diaz--that for the lab report to be admissible the analyst had to testify—by presenting on the stand an 
expert co-worker in the lab who had nothing to do with the particular test and report but could testify to the 
process. The Court rejected such a “surrogate witness” approach. Exactly what Bullcoming did and didn’t decide is 
discussed in Coleman & Rothstein, Grabbing the Bullcoming by the Horns, 90 Neb. L. Rev. 502 (2011). 
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hypothetical set of facts put to the on-the-stand expert (the one from the Illinois state police lab 
who testified to the match). Thus its contents were not offered for their truth, but as the basis of 
the expert’s testimony. Crawford had said, in a general context, that statements not offered for 
their truth do not present a Confrontation Clause problem.61  
Essentially, in other words, the examination was treated as the equivalent of this:  
Q. [By prosecutor to the testifying expert from the Illinois police lab, perhaps after some 
preliminaries about the taking and sending of the sample to Cellmark and what the 
Cellmark report that came back contained]: "Assuming that the profile Cellmark sent 
back to you at the police lab was an accurate representation of the DNA profile of the 
sample of the semen that you sent to Cellmark that had been taken from the person of the 
victim, does it match the one that your state lab took from the defendant?" 
A. “Yes. It was a match.” [Perhaps with some more explanation.]     
 Alito’s position is that the witness’ actual testimony—though not precisely in the same 
form as above—was essentially like the above.  Alito says the testimony was intended to be 
conditional on the assumption that the facts in the report would be independently proved true. 
The critical point for Alito is that, on the theory for which it was offered, the witness’ testimony 
should not be read as claiming that anything in the report was true—just that she relied on its 
contents in forming her opinion. Since this was a bench trial without a jury, Alito says the judge, 
being sophisticated in such legal matters, understood that the facts in the report were not being 
advanced as true but merely as hypothetical assumptions, even though the form of the testimony 
could have made this limitation of purpose clearer (as it might have to do in a jury trial). 
 The testimony therefore conforms, Alito notes, to a well-accepted evidentiary (though not 
necessarily constitutional) procedure, codified by Federal Rule of Evidence 703. Rule 703 allows 
experts to expressly base their testimony on an assumed hypothetical state of facts. Such 
hypothetical facts are not be taken as proven by the fact-finder until there is independent 
evidence they are true. If there is no such subsequent proof that is believed, the opinion should 
be discounted or disregarded. The facts contained this way in expert testimony are not being 
offered to prove they are true, but rather are offered to show what assumptions the expert 
indulged in, in the process of arriving at his or her opinion testimony. If these assumptions prove 
not to be true, or are not proven, the worth of the testimony is to be judged accordingly. What 
would invoke the Confrontation Clause and require the Cellmark analysts live testimony is if the 
Cellmark report were claimed to express truth. If not offered for their truth, the argument goes, 
the statements in the Cellmark report as used in Williams are not testimonial under Crawford. 62 
Justice Alito may be in error about Rule 703. Upon closer examination of the Rule we see 
it allows this procedure only if the facts are “reasonably” relied upon by the testifying expert. 
61 Footnote 9 in Crawford, citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985). 
62 Cf. Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the Confrontation 
Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99 (2012). 
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Even then the judge has discretion to suppress them if they would be too prejudicial. Arguably 
when the material relied on would be constitutionally inadmissible--as Alito concedes it is in this 
part of the opinion--the judge might exercise this discretion. 
In general it may be sound to say a statement is not covered by the Confrontation Clause 
if not offered for its truth. Also, it may be a sound notion for evidentiary expert testimony and 
hearsay purposes, as 703 intends. But should this Rule 703 definition of “truth of the matter 
asserted”--which holds that an out-of-court statement is not offered for its truth when an expert’s 
testimony expressly relies on it--be accepted for Confrontation Clause purposes?  I would answer 
“no.” Such expert testimony so based inevitably influences fact-finders to accept the basis facts 
as true, despite instructions to the contrary. Moreover, there are a number of things confrontation 
and cross examination could reveal63 which would justify requiring those responsible for a 
forensic report—or other declarants on whom prosecution expert witnesses rely--to appear in 
court. 
 But even if Justice Alito is correct in his entire not-for-truth analysis, it would still be up 
to the fact-finder to decide whether the assumed hypothetical facts are indeed true before they 
could use the testifying expert’s opinion as evidence of guilt. If there is no other evidence to 
support the hypothetical facts on which the testifying expert’s opinion depends—here, the 
features of the DNA taken from the victim as reported in the Cellmark report--the trier-of-fact 
may not credit the on-the-stand expert’s opinion that there is a match between the DNA on the 
swab taken off the person of the victim, and the DNA in the defendant’s blood, since that 
opinion is based on hypothetical facts that have not been proven.  
 So, the question in Williams then comes down to this:  Was there other evidence 
supporting what was reported in the Cellmark report---that the DNA in the sample they 
examined from the victim had a certain set of features? If not, under standard evidentiary law, 
the expert’s testimony should have been stricken or disregarded and could not be considered to 
help establish guilt.  
 On this point, Justice Alito says there was indeed “other” evidence to support the 
hypothetical facts. That “other” evidence was the circumstantial evidence that the police sent a 
sample swabbed from the victim to Cellmark, a DNA profile came back from Cellmark, and it 
exactly matched the defendant’s, the person the victim testifies raped her. I will not go into 
Alito’s “other evidence” argument here. Questions have been raised about it elsewhere.64 
 But so far we have only examined the first part of Justice Alito’s opinion. Still writing for 
the plurality, he goes on to offer a second, independent, theory justifying admissibility in 
Williams—a theory additional to the not-for-truth theory discussed above.  
63 See Coleman & Rothstein, Williams v. Illinois and the Confrontation Clause: Does Testimony by a Surrogate 
Witness Violate the Confrontation Clause?, http://publicsquare.net/williams-v-illinois-and-the-confrontation-
clause-par-1, and at Georgetown Scholarly Commons, Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works, 
paper 740 (2011). 
64See Paul Rothstein, Myrna Raeder, & David Crump, EVIDENCE: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, 637-41 
(LexisNexis 4TH Ed. 2013).  
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This second theory is that the report itself was not testimonial, and thus could have been 
introduced directly even without using expert testimony as the conduit, because Mr.  Williams 
was not a suspect for the rape at the time of the Cellmark report, and only became one after the 
report. Alito holds that a statement can only be testimonial if there already is someone the police 
suspect—a “targeted” individual, so to speak.65  
Alito here relies in part on the word “against” in the Confrontation Clause, which 
provides that criminal accuseds must be confronted with the “witnesses against” them. The 
Cellmark report was not testimonial, because it was not specifically against the accused, but 
rather was to find a rapist.66  
While this is a relatively new theory in the Supreme Court cases,67 it bears some kinship 
to the expansion in Bryant of the emergency purpose doctrine of Davis. Alito’s theory could be 
regarded as an even further extension of the criminal-at-large-with-gun notion of emergency—
that there is a kind of emergency or danger to the public whenever a rapist has not yet been 
identified—i.e. whenever there is, on the loose, a person prone to violence, whether or not he has 
a gun--so that statements made in aid of identifying and arresting an unknown rapist are not 
made for testimonial purposes because they are preventive of a public danger rather than meant 
to memorialize evidence for potential use at trial. 
 Justice Alito puts his theory this way, also shedding some light on his view of the role of 
formality: 
The [Confrontation] Clause refers to testimony by witnesses against an accused, 
prohibiting modern-day practices that are tantamount to the abuses that gave rise to the 
confrontation right, namely, (a) out-of-court statements having the primary purpose of 
accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct, and (b) formalized 
statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. 
His part (a) is his new “target” theory.   
 Thus, the plurality holds, under this new theory, that 
“The primary purpose of the Cellmark report, viewed objectively, was not to accuse 
petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial. When the [Illinois police] lab sent the 
sample to Cellmark, its primary purpose was to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at 
large, not to obtain evidence for use against petitioner, who was neither in custody nor 
under suspicion at that time.” 
65 This somewhat resembles the routine or non-adversarial record doctrine that provides an exception to the law 
enforcement records exclusion in the hearsay exception for public records in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8). See 
U.S. v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Brown, 9 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1993), U.S. v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 
(9th Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1984). 
66  Alito adds that DNA tests have the potential of exculpating perhaps more than inculpating.  
67 It adds a twist to the primary purpose test, which previously seemed to require merely contemplation of use 
proecutorily not necessarily against any particular individual.   
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Under the plurality’s “target” theory, it is uncertain exactly what circumstances at the 
time of the testing or report would render the report non-testimonial. For example, such 
circumstances might conceivably include any of the following but it is uncertain: (1) the police 
do not yet have any suspect yet; (2) defendant himself not yet suspected in the particular crime; 
(3) defendant not yet suspected in any crime; (4) police not telling the lab there is a suspect (at 
least if the lab is truly an independent lab); or (5) no pertinent crime has yet been perpetrated (as 
when, for example, routine records of fingerprints or DNA are taken from a certain population 
for identity later when and if a crime is subsequently committed). Further, if suspicion of crime 
is the relevant factor, when does “interest” in an individual in connection with a crime, ripen into 
suspicion? 
The Supreme Court, of course, consists of nine Justices, the views of at least five of 
which constitute a majority. In Williams, which is the latest of the Court’s Confrontation Clause 
decisions, no five Justices lined up behind any of the theories of the Confrontation Clause that 
were expressed in the multiple opinions in the case. Four (the plurality: Justices Alito, Roberts, 
Kennedy and Breyer) lined up behind the not-for-truth and the target theory, both theories 
indicating no violation on the facts of Williams. Another four (the dissenters: Justices Kagan, 
Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor) rejected both those theories as engrafting made-up 
requirements onto the Confrontation Clause, and felt it was clear and obvious from Crawford, 
Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming  that Williams’ confrontation rights had been violated. The vote 
determining the result, and thus likely to become controlling in many future cases, was Justice 
Thomas’. His theory was not accepted by any other Justice; and he rejected all their theories. His 
theory was that the report was not formally attested to and thus was not testimonial68. In final 
admissibility result, then, he lined up with the four plurality votes,  that Williams’ rights had not 
been violated and the evidence was admissible, but he rejected the plurality’s reasons as 
amounting  new, fabricated, conditions attached to the Confrontation Clause. 
Having set forth the relevant Supreme Court precedents above, let us examine the two 
classes of statements that are the [main focus] of this article:  
Child Victim’s Statements to Teachers, Doctors, and the Like: Problematic Under 
Confrontation Precedent. 
In the case of the abused children’s statements we are concerned with in this paper,69 
there can be a number of problems under the somewhat confusing Supreme Court precedent just 
68 Under Justice Thomas’ “Formality” (“Solemnity”) theory, there is a distinction between the report in Williams, 
where Thomas voted for admissibility because the report was informal, and the reports in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming in which Thomas voted against admissibility. The report in Melendez-Diaz, was basically a sworn 
affidavit. The report in Bullcoming was not sworn, but was certified with the signatory affirming its truth. State law 
established the procedures in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, providing for the reports’ evidentiary use if in the 
proper form. Perhaps also contributing to the characterization of the reports as formal/solemn vel non was the 
fact that in Williams, as opposed to Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the private reporting lab was not an arm of the 
state. 
69 See statement (1) in the introduction, above. 
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outlined. The statement may have been made to a private70 professional (teacher or doctor) who, 
in addition to her educational, caring, or treating function, is charged by statute with reporting 
child abuse to authorities. Thus, when receiving the child’s statement, the professional may have 
been performing a dual function: a legal one in addition to his or her normal one. This may make 
the “primary purpose” and “agent of the law enforcement” determinations difficult and uncertain 
under existing precedent. A child’s statement to a welfare worker involves the same problems, 
and an additional one: Does the fact that the welfare worker actually works for the state make a 
difference? Is working for the state the same thing as working for law enforcement? What is 
significant for Confrontation Clause purposes: working for law enforcement, the government, or 
“none of the above”?  When the statement is to a teacher, if the teacher is a public school 
teacher, as opposed to a private school teacher, would that change things (always assuming there 
is a duty to report abuse whether the teacher is public or private)? 
Often these child statements will be made to a parent, family member, baby sitter, or 
teacher; or to a physician who may or may not have been suggested by the police or have some 
other law enforcement connection, in addition to the duty to report abuse. At what point is a 
connection to law enforcement (if required at all) sufficient for confrontation purposes?  How 
does the connection affect purpose? 
Further complicating the matter, a teacher or doctor’s “legal” purpose (under the 
reporting statute) might conceivably be deemed a protective purpose—to prevent further abuse 
of this child—almost an emergency, perhaps. It could be a purpose to trigger child protective 
welfare services and removal of the child from the abusive situation. Legally this might not be 
deemed a testimonial purpose. On the other hand, it might be. It could be viewed as a purpose to 
gain evidence for later adverse use or prosecutorial use. (However, even prosecution is also, in 
major part, for child protection.) If the statement is made to a welfare worker, perhaps the 
protective purpose is stronger.  
Aside from ambiguity about the professional’s purpose, the Supreme Court has said the 
purpose of the statement’s maker (here, the child) is also important. It will often be unclear 
whether a child of tender years can entertain any particular purpose when making these 
statements.71  Even if the child could entertain some purpose, it may be especially difficult to 
determine what purpose it was. Conceivably the child may have believed there was some kind of 
medical purpose to the visit. But it may be clear to adults that the person to whom the statement 
was being made definitely had a different purpose.  
There is further uncertainty if the child’s statement was volunteered, and not the subject 
of any real questioning or interrogation. It is unclear under present law, whether anything like 
70 We will assume the teacher or doctor is not formally employed by the state. If they are, the agency problem is 
more marked. 
71Justice Sotomayor writing for the Court in Bryant states in dicta that a lack of purpose counts as non-testimonial. 
See supra at ______________. Sometimes children are purposely told that a forthcoming interview has a certain 
purpose, to manipulate the confrontation result. 
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questioning is required. Further, if there were questions, the questions may have had an agenda 
unknown to the child, clouding the purpose inquiry. 
 Let us consider a hypothetical that is fairly representative of the situation in cases of 
child victimization. 
Representative Child Victim Hypothetical. 
 Janie S., 4 years old, comes home one day following a private pre-kindergarten session 
and an after-school visit with her estranged father. 
 (1) Janie’s Statement to Friend. On her way home, Janie tells her best friend, Maria, that 
her father (Mr. S) did so-and-so to her. They are acts which would constitute child abuse. When 
Janie arrives home, Janie’s mother (Mrs. S) notices some unusual physical and psychological 
symptoms. Janie won’t talk about it, but her mother suspects foul play, and calls the police. They 
suggest taking Janie to Dr. Martina Ellingsworth, a general practitioner specializing in treating 
physical and mental conditions of injured children, for a diagnosis of what happened and for 
treatment if necessary.  Mrs. S. takes Janie to see Dr. Ellingsworth. 
(2) Janie’s Statement to Doctor. Janie goes into the Dr.’s inner office without her mother, 
and privately recounts to Dr. Ellingsworth  (who has a very soothing and kindly visage) that 
Janie’s father did certain things to her. The things she recounts are indeed physical abuse.  
(3) Janie’s Statement to Police. After that session, Janie and her mother go to the police, 
though Janie does not know it is the police and thinks it is just some friends of her mother—they 
are a plain-clothes unit established for these purposes.  Janie goes privately, without her mother, 
into a child-friendly room with Officer Amanda Carr, who gains her confidence.  Janie tells 
Officer Carr the same story she told the doctor. 
(4) Janie’s Statement to Mother. Janie later recounts the same thing in a little more detail, 
to her mother. Just before telling her mother, Janie has been apprised by her mother that there is 
a custody battle between Mr. and Mrs. S. concerning Janie, and that if Janie wishes to continue 
living with Mommy (which Janie does wish), “we have to have something bad on Daddy.” 
(5) Janie’s Statement to Baby Sitter. Janie later recounts the same story she told the 
doctor and her mother, to the babysitter, out of the presence of her mother. 
(6) Janie’s Statement to Child Welfare Worker. At some point, Janie tells the same story 
to a government child welfare worker who has been assigned to investigate the case. 
18 
 
Mr. S. is subsequently criminally charged with the physical abuse of little Janie. For one 
reason or another little Janie does not or cannot testify at trial,72 does not attend the trial,73 and 
has not been available for cross examination at any other point.74  
Under the Confrontation Clause,75 which of the above statements of Janie would be 
admissible against Mr. S. at his trial? Assume the person to whom Janie made each statement 
proposes to testify to it and that none of this would be blocked by the jurisdiction’s hearsay rule 
because the jurisdiction has a wide-reaching child hearsay exception that would cover all these 
statements.76 
(1)Janie’s Statement to Her Friend. 
 This statement seems to lack any of the indicia of testimoniality that might be 
requirements under Crawford and its progeny.  They were all mentioned in Crawford in support 
of its finding of Mrs. Crawford’s statement to be testimonial. Whether they are all required, is 
72 See footnotes ___ and ___ supra. Normally, if the declarant testifies at trial, then the former out-of-court 
statements would be admissible insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned. If Janie does testify at trial, 
conceivably a question could arise as to whether the opportunity to cross-examine an extremely young child about 
an earlier statement is constitutionally adequate, but a good argument can be made based on Owens CITE…. that it 
would be. 
73 A few cases by analogy to the notice-and-demand procedure seemingly approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
dicta in Melendez-Diaz (infra) have treated as waiver of confrontation rights by defendant, a situation where the 
victim is present in the courtroom and the defendant does not call the victim to the witness stand. See, e.g., 
Trevizo v. State, __S.W. 3d (2014), 2014 WL 260591. 
74 If the child was available for cross exam at some previous time (and unavailable for on-the-stand testimony now) 
this normally would solve the Confrontation problem and the hearsay statement would be admissible, but, 
depending on the circumstances of that former opportunity to cross examine, questions could arise as to the 
constitutional adequacy of that opportunity much like those that arise under the former testimony exception to 
the hearsay rule regarding similarity of motive, whether  anyone other than defendant’s opportunity would suffice, 
etc. Questions might also arise as to what exactly constitutes present unavailability.  See Paul Rothstein, Myrna 
Raeder, & David Crump, EVIDENCE: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, § 10.02 and p. 583 (LexisNexis 4TH Ed. 
2013). And, if the child is presently declared incompetent to testify, questions could be raised about the 
competency of the hearsay statement and adequacy of any previous cross-examination of the child, depending 
upon the reason given for the declared incompetency to testify at trial.  
75 There may be other problems with this evidence, e.g., evidentiary or Due Process problems. But let us 
concentrate on the Confrontation Clause. 
76  I will treat each of the enumerated statements separately, independent of the others—i.e. as though 
each were the only statement made. This is to avoid the possibility that later statements may be 
considered the product of an earlier one that is testimonial, with the result that the later one would be 
tainted, too, even if the later one viewed in isolation would not be. I want to examine the testimoniality 
of each statement itself, without the possibility of this kind of taint. I also have not built in facts that 
might justify application of the doctrine that by threatening the child, the defendant may have forfeited 
his constitutional rights. See generally Clifford S. Fishman, The Child Declarant, the Confrontation Clause, 
and the Forfeiture Doctrine, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 279 (2010). 
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uncertain. But at least we know that if none of them were present, the statement is not 
testimonial. 
 Recall what those indicia were: 
  --Prosecutorial or similar purpose   
  --Government or law enforcement involvement.   
  --Formality, solemnity, or structure to the interview.    
   --That the statement was made under some kind of interrogation or questioning. 
 
Crawford specifically says, concerning statements to friends without testimonial purpose: 
 
 [T]he Confrontation Clause . . . applies to “witnesses” against the accused--in other 
words, those who ‘bear testimony.’ ‘Testimony,’ in turn, is typically ‘[a] solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’  An 
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense 
that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.... [An] “off-hand, 
overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion 
under hearsay rules [but not under the  Confrontation Clause].” 77 
And the court makes a similar point about wholly private statements in the domestic violence 
case of Giles v. California when it states that the Confrontation Clause does not exclude 
“[s]tatements to friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation and statements to physicians 
in the course of receiving treatment….”78  
 This statement to Janie’s friend would be constitutionally admissible.79  
(2) Janie’s Statement to Dr. Ellingsworth. 
 Under current confrontation law, as outlined above, there are a number of legal issues 
that are unresolved concerning this statement’s status under the Confrontation Clause: 
(a) Does a statement have to be received by an agent of the government (or law 
enforcement) for the statement to be inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause?  If so, would 
Dr. Ellingsworth qualify as such an agent for these purposes?   
77 Crawford  at 51. (Emphasis supplied.) 
 
78 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) at 376. 
79 See, e.g., U.S. v. Harry, 2014 WL 1950409 (D. N.M. 2014)(victim’s statement recounting the rape to a friend while 
still upset and crying immediately after the rape, admissible insofar as hearsay rule is concerned and insofar as 
Confrontation Clause concerned; additional reason for the latter was because prosecution said it intended to have 
the victim testify); State v. Avila, 324 P.3d 342 (Kan. 2014) (victim statement to friend constitutionally subject to 
multi-factor test; here, very casual statement about medical condition held not testimonial because no testimonial 
purpose or contemplation). 
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The Supreme Court has never answered whether an agent of the state (or law 
enforcement) must be involved. 80 In all of the Confrontation cases so far, the people to whom 
the statement was given have been law-enforcement agents of the state, like police or 
prosecutors.81 In Davis the 911 operator was assumed to be part of the police without deciding 
because it didn’t matter: the statement was non-testimonial for other reasons.   
Depending upon the evil at which the Confrontation Clause is aimed, an argument can be 
made that an agent of the state (or of law enforcement) must be involved in obtaining the 
statement before the Clause kicks in. If the Clause’s concern is with state overreaching, an agent 
of the state (or maybe more particularly, law enforcement) would be required. If the concern is 
solely with unreliability (whether state-produced or not), such agency might not be required. For 
example, a statement made purposely to get someone into legal trouble, made to someone not 
connected with law enforcement or the state, might qualify. This might be the case, for example, 
in Janie’s statements (3), (4) and (5), above. 
If an agent is required, there is an open question about how much connection a person 
must have with the state or law enforcement to be deemed an agent for these purposes.  On the 
facts here, Dr. Ellingsworth may or may not have been selected by the police, and may have 
some longer-standing arrangements with them. But in any event, she may have another 
connection to law enforcement as well: she probably is under a statutory duty to report suspected 
child abuse. It is uncertain whether either of these, alone or in combination, would constitute 
sufficient connection if there is a connection requirement.82 
(b) Must there be an interrogation? Must there be “formality”? 
The Court has been ambiguous about whether there must be something that can be called 
questioning or interrogation, for there to be a Confrontation violation, and if so, what counts as 
80In a context particularly pertinent to our consideration of the statement to Dr. Ellingsworth, a “no” answer to this 
question is inferentially suggested by the fact that Crawford expressed approval of the Confrontation Clause result 
(though overruling the particular approach to the clause) of Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). Wright excluded 
pursuant to the Confrontation Clause a statement of a child about the child’s molestation made to a private 
pediatrician. Similarly, Justice Scalia (the author of the  Crawford opinion)  indirectly indicates no state agency is 
required, in his dissent in Bryant, by relying on King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 200, 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 202-03 (K.B. 
1799) in which the court rejected a hearsay statement by a child to her mother (a private person) after the child 
was sexually assaulted, offered in evidence against the accused assaulter. See Paul Rothstein, Myrna Raeder, and 
David Crump, EVIDENCE: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 612 (4TH Ed. 2013). Ohio v. Clark, when decided, may 
shed some light on this. 
  
81 It is possible that law enforcement affiliation is not in itself an independent requirement, but merely a part of 
the purpose determination: that normally the law enforcement connection is evidence suggesting a testimonial 
purpose.   
82 The U.S. Supreme Court, in the pending Ohio v. Clark case, supra, n.____, will presumably decide by June 2015 
whether an agent of law enforcement is required, and if so, may shed some light on what connection to law 
enforcement is needed for one to be such an agent. The question there is whether a child’s statement upon 
questioning by a private teacher implicating defendant in abuse of the child, should be excluded as a testimonial 
statement under the Confrontation Clause when the teacher is obligated under law to report suspected child 
abuse. The dissent in that case suggested that a law enforcement connection is not required, but that the purpose 
test may be different if there is such agency.  
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questioning or interrogation. Every pertinent Supreme Court case so far has involved some kind 
of questioning. The court has side-stepped the issue until now83 because there has not been a 
case of a volunteered statement yet and the court has said in situations where there might be 
doubt, that the questioning was enough even if there is a requirement along these lines. On our 
hypothetical facts, there probably is some questioning by the doctor, although we don’t know 
how much and if it is enough, assuming the requirement applies at all. 
Closely allied is the question as to whether some “formality” of the conversation is 
required before there can be a Confrontation violation.  Only Justice Thomas seems to 
concentrate on formality, but Crawford itself may suggest something along the lines of a kind of 
formality requirement.  
The formality in the session with the doctor in our case, is very little. The Court has said 
mere questioning by the police is sufficient if formality is required. The formality of the doctor 
setting in our problem is less than that, but it is anybody’s guess as to whether it would be 
sufficient for the Court. It probably would not be for Justice Thomas.84 
(c) What is the Statement’s Primary Purpose? 
In Bryant, the Court said if its “primary purpose” is to gather evidence, the statement is 
testimonial and impermissible. The Court goes on to say the purpose of both maker and recipient 
must be taken into account, but the test is an “objective” one: what a reasonable person viewing 
all the circumstances would say the primary purpose was. It is unclear whether the “objective” 
purpose would be deemed by the Court to govern if a statement that had a benign purpose when 
objectively viewed was in actuality motivated by a purpose to incriminate or make evidence 
against someone. 
Here, Dr. Ellingsworth’s purpose was twofold, presumably:  to treat, and at least in part, 
to secure evidence. The latter further subdivides into two possible purposes: to provide evidence 
for a prosecution, or to provide evidence for removal of Janie (and any other siblings) from 
further contact with her father—i.e., to protect Janie and any siblings.  While we know the 
prosecutorial purpose would be a testimonial purpose, the Court’s decisions are not clear about 
whether the removal purpose would be or not.85 (A prosecutorial purpose may be precluded if 
there is a doctor-patient privilege covering the child’s statement, although a counter-argument 
would be that the child or her mother would probably waive it. In federal law and the law of 
some states, there is no doctor-patient privilege. In many states there are exceptions that may 
83 However, Justice Scalia writing the majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts commented by way of 
dictum “The framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to 
open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.” 557 U.S. 305 at _____(2009). 
This statement was made in refuting the dissent’s contention that a lab report did not involve an interrogation and 
thus should be exempt from the confrontation requirement. But clearly the lab analysis and report, requested by 
the police, was not volunteered in the sense we are discussing. 
84 When decided, Ohio v. Clark may shed some light on the issue of questioning and formality. See footnote 
immediately supra. 
85 It is unclear under the precedent whether (1) this could be a non-testimonial purpose even if it doesn’t qualify as 
a Davis or Bryant emergency purpose, and (2) whether it might qualify as a Davis or Bryant emergency purpose. 
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cover this kind of child’s statement. So, privilege would probably not preclude a prosecutorial 
purpose on the part of Dr. Ellingsworth.) 
It is a difficult or insoluble question to ask which of these many purposes was his 
“primary” purpose-- medical or legal and which legal purpose.   
Further, perhaps it varied from part to part of the questioning. Questions like “Does it 
hurt here?” are probably medical.  A question like “Who did it?” might be solely a legal question 
except where, as here, the treatment by the doctor is both medical and psychological. The 
identity of the abuser as a family member may bear strongly on the psychological treatment.  
While the medical and psychological purpose might be clearly non-testimonial, the legal 
purpose of the “Who did it” question might be either testimonial or not—clearly testimonial if 
meant to gather evidence for a prosecution; not so clearly testimonial if meant to secure evidence 
to protect Janie by removal of visitation. 
But anyway, is the purpose of the statement’s recipient (the doctor) enough? Janie, the 
maker of the statement, may have thought that, since this is a doctor, the purpose of the whole 
thing is medical treatment, if she thought anything about purpose at all.  
However, Justice Sotomayor in Bryant tells us it is not so much what the participants 
actually thought was the primary purpose, but what an objective reasonable person viewing all 
the circumstances would think was the purpose.86 
Depending on more facts, which we don’t have, a reasonable adult looking at the 
circumstances from outside might know there was an evidence-gathering purpose in the session 
with Dr. Ellingsworth, as well as a medical-treative purpose, but might be unable to say which 
was “primary” overall—except perhaps if each question asked in the interview were considered 
separately. In that event some questions might be understood as having a clear treative purpose, 
some a clear legal purpose, but what legal purpose—prosecutorial or protective, to remove Janie 
from the situation?  
With some of the questions—like “Who did it?” an adult objective observer might not 
even be able to narrow the purpose down as between legal and medical, let alone which legal 
one, as indicated above about that particular question.  
86 It is interesting to note that Justice Sotomayor makes a significant change in the language of Crawford 
as to purpose.  Bryant: to objective observer “the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Crawford: “ ‘made under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial.’ ” Sotomayor’s version could be read to mean all that the purpose need 
to encompass is proving past events, if in fact those events are relevant to later criminal prosecution 
whether or not their relevance to criminal prosecution was known or part of the purpose. The Crawford 
articulation precludes that interpretation, and requires awareness of the possibility of use at a later trial.  
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At any rate, the Court has not told us if this kind of piecemeal characterization of parts of 
the conversation is proper or whether the effort should be to characterize the whole session. 87  
The Court has left us with a further ambiguity making a solution to our hypothetical even 
more difficult—an ambiguity that re-introduces a problem that may appear to have been 
removed by the “objective” approach—that is, the problem that the child’s view may be different 
than the doctor’s. Under the “objective” approach, is the objective reasonable observer an adult 
looking in from the outside, or is it one standing in the shoes of the participants? And what 
attributes does this reasonable person have? In our case, is it the reasonable child (like the person 
making the statement, Janie)? Or the reasonable adult (like the doctor)? That could make a vast 
difference here. When the court says the purpose of both participants must be taken into account, 
but cautions that an “objective” view must be taken, we are at a loss to know how this is to be 
done where the two participants might perceive or have different purposes.88 
Needless to say, the Court has not given us a clear message on this kind of statement by 
children.89 
(d) Must there be a “targeted” suspect? If so, what constitutes “targeting”? 
Four members of the Court have said (in Williams) that the Confrontation Clause is not 
involved unless the police have a suspect at the time of the making of the statement. I.e., they 
must have targeted an individual, and, presumably, that individual has to be the one the statement 
implicates, the one the statement is offered against at trial. This “target” requirement is probably 
based on the notion that the Confrontation Clause is primarily concerned with avoiding potential 
state overreaching rather than with assuring against all the various kinds of incredibility cross-
exam customarily is concerned with.  
87 Bryant states, in what is probably dictum, that the character of an interview as testimonial or non-testimonial 
can change if the purpose changes as the interview moves forward. Cite page. 
88 Ohio v. Clark when decided by the Supreme Court may shed some light on how primary purpose is to 
be determined where a child statement is involved, and whether a protective (removal) purpose is 
testimonial or not. The dissent in the state Supreme Court suggests that a different test of purpose 
applies if the statement is made to non-law-enforcement personnel like a teacher (or presumably a 
doctor). This different test seems to be one that (1) asks what would an objective (non-child) reasonable 
person observer from outside at the time have felt the declarant thought was the questioner’s purpose, 
and (2) does not limited us, in deciding purpose, to a choice between resolving an emergency and 
gathering evidence for prosecution, as in the case where law enforcement is directly involved, but could 
entertain lots of other non-testimonial purposes, such as a child-protective purpose, or preventing 
transmission of venereal diseases. The reason the choice is limited in the law enforcer situation is that 
“[p]olice officers in our society function as both first responders and criminal investigators.”  
 
 
89 Cf. Deborah Paruch, Silencing the Victims in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions:  The Confrontation 
Clause and Children’s Hearsay Statements Before and After Michigan v. Bryant, 28 TOURO L. REV. 85 
(2012). 
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It is uncertain whether the “target” requirement would apply to our hypothetical, because 
only four of the nine members of the Court believe it is a requirement. But let us examine the 
vagaries if it did apply. 
The Court has not said to what degree the investigation has to have focused on an 
individual for him to qualify as “targeted”. In our hypothetical, suspicion certainly was focused 
on a small number of culprits from the beginning, since Janie had just come from both a pre-
school session and an after-school visit with her father. Her father was an obvious suspect, along 
with people from the pre-school.  Was the father sufficiently “targeted” by police at the time she 
made her statement?  It is unclear how far the investigation had focused on her father, and how 
focused it had to be to satisfy the “target” requirement.90 
(e) Can the statement escape Confrontation Clause scrutiny if it is made the basis for 
expert testimony? 
In Williams, four members of the Court held that the Confrontation Clause may allow an 
expert to incorporate into her testimony a statement of another person which statement if offered 
into evidence directly, without the expert, would violate the Confrontation Clause. (Let us call 
this Justice Alito’s “not-for-truth” theory as he wrote the opinion for these four.) 
In our hypothetical, Dr. Ellingsworth might try to avail herself of this option by, say, 
giving an opinion on the stand that Janie was physically abused by her father, and expressly 
basing that opinion in part on what Janie said in Ellingsworth’s office. Assuming the 
jurisdiction’s evidentiary law of expert testimony and hearsay allowed this (which it well might), 
Justice Alito’s not-for-truth theory would allow this under the Confrontation Clause as a 
permissible end-run even if Janie’s statement itself were found to violate the Clause. 
Since five members of the Court in Williams rejected the legitimacy of this kind of expert 
end-run, this theory alone would not secure the admissibility of this Ellingsworth evidence in our 
hypothetical.   
In sum, it is very unclear as to whether Janie’s statement to Dr. Ellingsworth would be 
constitutionally admissible or not.91 
(3) Janie’s Statement to the Police 
Here, Janie probably has no purpose other than to tell the story (probably counted as a 
non-testimonial purpose). 92 The police, however, have an agenda—to gather evidence, probably 
for prosecution rather than for removal of contact between Janie and her father.93 This squarely 
90 Ohio v. Clark may shed some light on this problem of “targeting”. 
91 See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Confrontation Clause and Experts, 27 CRIM. JUST. 55 (2012). 
 
92 Cite Bryant where Sotomayor says that having no purpose, is equivalent to a non-testimonial purpose. 
93 Perhaps an argument could be made that police have a purpose to catch a dangerous criminal on the loose, as in 
Bryant, but that is stretching the “resolving an emergency” concept too far. They may, however, have a protective 
purpose that is not a prosecutorial purpose. 
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poses the question of what is to be done where the questioner has a different purpose than the 
speaker, even objectively viewed, only one of which would make the statement violative of the 
Confrontation Clause.   
Justice Sotomayor’s formulation in Bryant, that both intentions must be considered on an 
objective basis, does not make clear what should be the approach in this situation. Again, it may 
depend on one’s view of what is the main concern of the Confrontation Clause—state 
overreaching, or facilitating exploration of all the kinds of inaccuracies—lying, mistake, 
insincerity—customarily explored by cross-examination. A concern with state overreaching 
suggests the purpose of the questioner should be paramount. If the concern is a broader range of 
potential sources of inaccuracy and incredibility, the purpose of the speaker seems significant. 
This was issue (c) (purpose) above, under Janie’s statement to Dr. Ellingsworth, and it is a 
problem as well here, in this situation where Janie is speaking to the police. 
Let us see how some of the other lettered issues above (under Janie’s statement to Dr. 
Ellingsworth) apply to this situation. 
Issue (a) (state agency) is not a problem here. The police are clearly agents of the state 
and law enforcement. 
Issue (b) (interrogation, formality). It seems this is not a problem here. It is almost the 
same on this score as Crawford itself, except probably no tape recording made (although our 
hypothetical is unclear on this). But Davis and Bryant do not seem to require a tape recording.  
Justice Thomas may require an affidavit or the like, but the other Justices in these cases, and 
particularly in the forensic reports cases, do not seem to feel that this degree of formality is an 
indispensable requirement for a Confrontation violation. We do not know in our hypothetical, 
whether the police wrote the statement down, had Janie sign it, or had any other accoutrements 
of an affidavit. Probably none of these. In all the cases thus far in the Supreme Court where the 
statement has been held testimonial, there has either been a sound or written recordation 
(Crawford, Davis, Bryant) and that has been mentioned as possibly significant.  CHECK THIS 
This might (though it is unlikely) form the basis for an argument that Janie’s statement to the 
police is nontestimonial.  
Issue (d) (targeting). The same problem is involved here, as above under Janie’s 
statement to Dr. Ellingsworth. 
Although it is far from clear, the result here would probably be that Janie’s statement to 
the police would be considered testimonial.94 
(4) Janie’s Statement to Her Mother 
Here, both speaker and recipient have an actual purpose to incriminate, which can be 
taken as equivalent to purpose to make evidence against a targeted individual, although one 
94 Cf. Thomas D. Lyon & Julia A. Dente, Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1181 (2012). 
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could split hairs and say it is a non-prosecutorial purpose in that it was only meant to affect civil 
custody proceedings.95  
 Presumably such actual purpose prevails over “objectively determined” purpose, if that 
means anything different.  
So the only problem here is that there is no argument here that agents of the state or law 
enforcement are involved in the session.  If such agents are significant only to help determine 
purpose, it should not matter that no agent is involved here. But it is not clear from the precedent 
that that is the only significance. Such agency may be an independent requirement. The Supreme 
Court has not yet decided a Confrontation case in which no agent of the state or law enforcement 
was involved in securing the statement.96  
If the Confrontation Clause is concerned only with the possibility of state overreaching, 
that would not be a concern here and the Clause should not apply.97 If the Clause is concerned 
with providing an opportunity for a relatively thorough exploration of credibility, then the Clause 
should apply.  
The ultimate result here is uncertain. 
(5) Janie’s Statement to Babysitter 
In some ways this is the converse of (2) (statement to police), because here the speaker 
has the testimonial intent but the listener probably does not—but there is no state involvement so 
in that respect it is like (3) (statement to mother) except both parties to the exchange do not have 
the testimonial intent. 
Thus, the ultimate result is even more uncertain. 
(6) Janie’s Statement to the Welfare Worker 
95 Detracting from clarity here, however, is the fact that the child may not clearly regard this as any kind of thing 
that would be deemed an evidentiary-legal-testimonial purpose. Further complicating the matter is that the 
mother has a protective purpose, too. 
96 However, Ohio v. Clark, when decided, may shed some light on this. See footnote___supra.  Justice Scalia (the 
author of the Supreme Court’s Crawford opinion) indirectly indicates no agent of the state need be involved, by a 
case he cites in his dissent in Bryant. The case he cites is particularly appropriate to our hypothetical statement at 
this point (a statement by Janie to her mother) because it involves a practically identical statement by a child to 
her mother about abuse. The case is King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 200, 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 202-03 (K.B. 1799) in 
which the court rejected a hearsay statement by a child to her mother (a private person) after the child was 
sexually assaulted, offered in evidence against the accused assaulter. A similar possible indicator that no agent of 
the state need be involved, could conceivably be inferred by the fact that Crawford expressed approval of the 
result under the Confrontation Clause (though overruled the precise reasoning) of Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 
(1990), which case excluded pursuant to the Confrontation Clause a statement of a child about the child’s 
molestation made to a private pediatrician. See Paul Rothstein, Myrna Raeder, & David Crump, EVIDENCE: CASES, 
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 612 (LexisNexis 4TH Ed. 2013). 
 
97 I am putting aside the possibility that what happened in the earlier statements might be considered state 
participation that influenced this statement to her mother. 
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Assuming the conversation with the government welfare worker came before the mother 
told Janie “we need something bad on Daddy”, and before police had focused on the father, 
Janie’s statements to the welfare worker are like the statement to the doctor. But there are certain 
pertinent differences. The argument the welfare worker is an agent of the state is stronger 
because she works for the government. Further, instead of one of the purposes being a medical 
treatment purpose, there is a protective purpose of preventing contact by the father with Janie 
and siblings (if any).98 More of the questions will be directed to that end, although there may be 
some concern with the medical needs of the child as well. The professional’s motive of reporting 
for prosecutorial purposes may be less. In the current state of the law, it is extremely unclear 
whether the statements here would be regarded as testimonial. The stronger “agency of the state” 
factor may tip this more toward inadmissibility than in the case of the statement to the doctor. 
But if there is a privilege—that is not waivable by the client, as in some states-- covering 
statements to the welfare worker so that they could not be used prosecutorialy, then the 
statements to the social worker are less likely to be considered testimonial than the statements to 
the doctor. 
 If the session with the social worker came after the mother’s urging the child to get 
something “bad on Daddy”, this would increase the chances the statements to the social worker 
would be considered testimonial because of the arguably “incriminating” intent of the declarant. 
Bottom Line, with respect to all these statements of Janie, it is uncertain what the 
constitutional admissibility result would be. There are factual unclarities, but more importantly, 
unclarities of Supreme Court doctrine. 
Adult Victims’ Statements to the Dual Functioning Professional (e.g. to SANEs, 
DOVEs, and SARTs)99 
What are SANEs, DOVEs, and SARTs?100 
98It is unclear under the precedent whether (1) this could be a non-testimonial purpose even if it doesn’t qualify as 
a Davis or Bryant emergency purpose, and (2) whether and under what circumstances it might qualify as a Davis or 
Bryant emergency purpose. 
  
99 See Julia Chapman, Nursing the Truth: Developing a Framework for Admission of SANE Testimony Under the 
Medical Treatment Hearsay Exception and the Confrontation Clause, 50 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 277 (2013).   
100 See generally Jenifer A. Ort, The Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner, 102 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF NURSING 24GG 
(Sept. 2009);  DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT NURSE EXAMINER DEVELOPMENT & OPERATION GUIDE  (1999); Stacey 
Beth Plichta, et. al., The Emergency Department and Victims of Sexual Violence: An Assessment of Preparedness to 
Help, JOURNAL OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ADMINISTRATIOn, Winter 2006, at 286; The Role of SANEs, INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF FORENSIC NURSES, http://www.iafn.org; Kelly Gray-Eurom, The Sexual Assault Forensic Examination: 
Do We Make a Difference?, EMERGENCY MEDICINE NEWS, June 2002; SANE Program Locator, SEXUAL ASSAULT RESOURCE 
SERVICE http://www.sane-sart.com/staticpages/index/php.?page=2003102341144274; NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS 
ASSOCIATION, THE ROLE OF THE SEXUAL ASSAULT NURSE EXAMINER (2007); TEXAS OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, SEXUAL ASSAULT 
PREVENTION AND CRISIS SERVICES (2012); NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PROVIDING SERVICES TO 
SURVIVORS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (1998); Janet Ericson, et. al., Clients’ Experience with a Specialized Sexual Assault 
Service, 28 JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY NURSING 86, 87-90 (Feb. 2002). 
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 Programs designed to specially address the then-underserved needs of sexual assault 
victims burgeoned in the 1990’s in hospitals and emergency rooms throughout the U.S. so that 
today they operate in all states and D.C.  They began and continue in most places under the name 
SANE (“Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners”). In 1995 SANE nursing was recognized as a sub-
specialty of forensic nursing by the American Nursing Association.101  
 
SANEs frequently operate out of hospital departments specially equipped for the SANE 
task or the task of forensic nurses generally. These units are sometimes called DOVE units 
(“Developing Options for Violent Emergencies”).  Additionally, somewhat similar units have 
occasionally sprung up called SARTs (“Sexual Assault Response Teams”). These sometimes 
have a more formal connection to the police and may operate out of the police department.  
 
To become a SANE, a person must be a registered nurse first and then undergo special 
SANE.102  SANEs, like nurses generally, are under an ethical duty to serve the patient’s best 
interests.103 SANEs are charged with attending to the medical, psychological, and social 
problems of these special victims; with employing sound scientific methods for obtaining and 
preserving evidence; and with equipping themselves to testify if needed in judicial proceedings 
about both the injuries and the proper handling of the evidence.104   
     
101 Forensic Nurses who are not SANEs perform similar tasks with respect to other violent offenses. 
102 A basic SANE course is comprised of about 40 hours.  Hospitals sometimes obtain state funding of these training 
programs. Although there is no national certification, there are local training and state certification programs.  
National guidelines have been promulgated by the U.S. Department of Justice and state guidelines are published 
by state attorneys general and departments of health and human services. A SANE training program typically 
includes, on the treatment side, specialty medical techniques, how to test for and treat sexually transmitted 
diseases, how to test for and counsel on preventing pregnancy, how to assess injuries, psychological instruction 
about how victims typically react to their situation, and crisis intervention techniques. On the forensic side, the 
nurses are trained in forensic photography, the documenting of injuries, and how to prepare for and give 
courtroom testimony. Gynecologists generally do the medical training; forensic instruction is often handled by 
local police or by personnel from prosecuting attorneys’ offices. 
 
 
103 The nurse’s “primary commitment is to… the patient. . . .”AMERICAN NURSING ASSOCIATION CODE OF ETHICS, 2.1: 
Primacy of Patient Interests. 
104 Their duties include emotional support, prevention of, treatment for, and guidance concerning sexually 
transmitted diseases, emergency contraception, and referral to counseling. SANEs are also tasked with identifying 
and keeping a record of injuries and collecting and preserving evidence for subsequent use in criminal proceedings.  
Their file will include a combination of items like the patient’s medical history, a physical assessment of the 
patient, and details of the assault. SANEs also instruct victims on how to report the assault, and the SANE prepares 
a “rape kit” for victims who choose to so report. The rape kit includes items of evidentiary significance such as a 
description by the victim of the assault, any background concerning it, and matters preceding the assault.  It also 
includes a medical history and evaluation, an assessment of trauma, what orifices were involved, sperm and 
seminal fluid specimens, foreign biological matter collected, scrapings and clippings from fingernails, results of 
public hair  combings for material, blood for typing or DNA analysis, urine samples, torn clothing, stains, etc.  
Evidence is collected and given to law enforcement only if the victim consents.  The SANE is responsible for 
maintaining a secure chain of custody for the evidence.   
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Representative Adult Victim and SANE Nurse Hypothetical 
One evening on a shopping center parking lot, R.R. is forced into her car and raped by a 
stranger, who then runs off into the night. R.R. is able to cell-phone her best friend, Marilyn, 
who arrives at the car moments later to find R.R. disheveled and crying. Marilyn drives R.R. to 
the emergency room at nearby Samaritan Hospital where, upon hearing it was a sexual assault, 
the desk summons a female SANE immediately. The SANE takes R.R. into a private examining 
room, finds out what happened, and obtains the  information and performs the functions 
described in our subsection just above. In the course of that examination, R.R. describes in detail 
the assault, and its perpetrator, who has some very distinctive features, ultimately enabling the 
police to catch the defendant when the police are subsequently notified of the rape.  
At defendant’s trial—in order to help prove the rape occurred, that it was not consenting, 
and that this defendant, with his distinctive features, was the rapist--the SANE proposes to testify 
to what the victim told her. R.R. has been declared unavailable for trial because of the severe 
mental trauma of the event. She has not been available for any earlier cross examination, either. 
(Let us assume that the finding of unavailability for both purposes is sufficient for any legal 
question to which it is relevant.) The state in which this is being tried has a hearsay exception 
which will allow the statement into evidence insofar as the hearsay rule is concerned. The state 
will regard the victim’s statements to the SANE as within the hearsay exception for statements 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Assume the jurisdiction has a line of cases 
notoriously lenient about what qualifies for the exception.105 Assume further that the victim’s 
statements to the SANE are offered for their truth and not merely to explain the conduct of the 
police in going after the defendant, or any other purpose that is non-hearsay or not for the truth 
of the matter asserted by the victim. 
Is this testimony of the SANE constitutionally admissible under the Confrontation 
Clause?    
Let us examine in connection with this hypothetical, the lettered issues raised above in 
our hypothetical concerning the child Janie, where she speaks to Dr. Ellingsworth. They are the 
issues in the present hypothetical as well but with perhaps a slightly different posture.  We will 
examine them in the same order: 
(a) The Law Enforcement Issue. 
105 See Williams v. State, 2014 WL 895506 (Ct. App. Texas 2014) (victim’s statement to SANE recounting the rape, 
injuries, and identity of rapist is admissible under the statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or  treatment 
hearsay exception as well as under the Confrontation Cause, in both instances because the overall purpose of 
SANEs in such cases is medical). It should be noted that the hearsay exception determination and the 
Confrontation Clause determination are not inevitably linked to each other. The constitutional determination 
concerns “primary” purpose, not just purpose, and not necessarily of the declarant. Further, the decision is made 
by a different court (or at least a different line of precedent, deriving from the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of 
the Confrontation Clause) for different purposes.  
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One real problem with the statements to the SANE will be whether the SANE is 
sufficiently connected with law enforcement,106 assuming that is an independent requirement for 
there to be a confrontation violation. The argument with respect to Janie’s statement to the doctor 
was that he had such a connection because he had a legal duty to report child abuse. It would 
seem the connection with law enforcement is even stronger in the case of the law-enforcement 
trained SANE, although it is not quite so clear the SANE has a duty report if the victim does not 
wish to. This connection would be further strengthened in the SANE context if—as has been true 
in some cases--a policeman were present during the SANE interview of the victim, which may 
also affect “objective” perception of the primary purpose.107  
 (b) The Interrogation and Formality Issues. 
There will probably be no problem with formality, because the sessions are at least as 
formal as in Crawford. Nor will there be a problem concerning whether there was questioning or 
interrogation, because, again, the situation seems to be the equivalent of the session in Crawford 
insofar as this factor is concerned.  
(c) The Primary Purpose Issue 
In the case of an adult victim’s statements to the dual functioning nurse (the SANE or to 
other such doubly-functioning professional) there is obviously a major “primary purpose” 
problem in ascertaining whether the statement is “testimonial” and therefore inadmissible under 
the Confrontation Clause if the victim does not testify. This may be the most important problem 
here.  Usually in this situation, both participants will understand that the general overall purpose 
is both treative and prosecutorial. They may differ as to the primary purpose, with the victim, 
perhaps, more concerned about medical treatment.108 
106 Compare Hartsfield v. Commonwealth, 277 S.W.3d 239 (SANE’s testimony recounting victim’s statements 
inadmissible because SANE’s are agents of the police for collecting evidence; thus purpose not medical treatment) 
with State v. Lee, No. 22262 2005 WL 544837 (March 5. 2005 Ohio Ct. App.), aff’d 856 N.E.2d 921 (Ohio 2006) 
(SANE’s recounting of similar victim statement admissible: SANEs are medical practitioners, not law enforcement 
officers; purpose thus medical treatment, not trial testimony).  
 
107 See, e.g., State v. Bennington, 264 P.3d 440 (2011) (presence of law enforcement officer dispositive); State v. 
Hopper, 176 P.3d 911 (Idaho 2007) (somewhat semble); State v. Avila, 324 P.3d 342 (Kan. 2014) (mentioning that 
police presence at a SANE interview could make a difference). 
 
108 A number of courts focus on the declarant’s purpose in SANE cases, which tends to indicate a non-testimonial, 
medical treatment purpose. See, e.g., Michigan v. Garland, 777 N.W.2d 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (because victim went to emergency room to seek out medical treatment she intended statements relating the assault to be for treatment); State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834 at 844 (“[in]determining whether a statement is testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes, courts should focus on the expectation of the declarant at the time of making the statement; the intent of a questioner is relevant only if it could affect a reasonable declarant's expectations”). Query whether or not this approach complies with Bryant’s mandate to consider both declarant and declaree, but perhaps it does. It is not exactly clear what 
Bryant meant.  
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The “primary purpose” problem stems in major part from the professional’s dual role. It 
will often be ambiguous as to whether the statement was pursuant to the medical function (to 
treat the injury and the mental state of the victim) or the legal function (and what legal function: 
Prosecutorial? Protection of the victim from the rapist? Protection of the public from an at-large 
rapist?). 
The purpose of the professional with respect to particular statements may have been 
different than that of the victim. And different parts of statements—all in the same interview--
may have different purposes.  For example, an identification of the assaulter made by the victim, 
or the victim’s recounting of verbal exchanges during the attack, could arguably be regarded as 
having a more testimonial non-medical purpose than a statement describing physical injuries or 
pain which might have a more medical purpose. But, on the other hand, the identification or 
verbal exchanges (for example if they are threats threats) could be regarded as helpful to 
preventing further attacks on the victim or on members of the public—as in Bryant—or as 
necessary to diagnose, treat, or prevent HIV infection to the victim or others.109 Or it could be 
part of the psychological treatment if the assaulter was a friend or relative. 
Some statements may be clearly dual in purpose, to both examiner and examinee. Or 
some may appear to the victim to be primarily or even solely treative where in fact they are not 
to the professional.  
The victim may be unaware that a certain statement has significance in telling a more 
compelling narrative at trial (such as a recounting of certain peculiarities or perversions 
perpetrated that are not significant medically110).   
If the examination and statement are too long after the event the medical connection may 
be tenuous.111   
By and large, cases seem reluctant to look at individual details like these, and decline to 
parse particular statements or parts of statements to determine their individual purpose, but rather 
choose to characterize the whole interview, as primarily either medical or law enforcement, 
depending largely on the particular court’s view of the overall nature of the SANE institution,112 
 
109 This might be akin to the emergency doctrine of Davis and Bryant. It is arguable that a criminal on the loose 
who has HIV may constitute an emergency as much as a criminal on the loose with a weapon. 
 
110 Such as sniffing the victim’s hair or items of clothing, or taking possession of stockings or underwear, which 
appear to be not unheard-of practices in some of these cases. 
111 But, again, even here the statement may have medical significance—for example to follow up on injuries or to 
determine HIV infection—or to prevent the spread of infection to others. As indicated,  
112 For example, in State v. Romero, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) the victim’s statement did not identify the 
assailant, and contained what seemed to be matters related to her condition, yet the court said because it 
recounted a crime it was accusatory and therefore testimonial.  There are cases that are exceptions to the blanket 
approach. E.g., State v. Avila, 324 P.3d 342 (Kan. 2014) suggesting that a statement of identity to a paramedic 
might be testimonial despite an overall medical purpose, and discussing the different status of various different 
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some courts seeing the SANE’s function as primarily gathering and preserving evidence for 
potential prosecution, and some as primarily medical.113  Moreover, most of these courts see this 
characterization as dispositive—that is, the primary purpose determination determines the result, 
regardless of the other issues we have indicated are pertinent to the ultimate outcome on 
Constitutional Confrontation-Clause admissibility. 
There is occasionally a deviation from this blanket approach in certain extreme fact 
situations where the SANE’s general function decidedly should not be the sole indicator of 
purpose. For example, a policeman’s presence during the SANE interview has tilted the purpose 
determination toward a purpose of gathering evidence for prosecution.114 So too has the result 
been shifted in that direction where, because of the length of time between the rape and the 
interview, the interview’s purpose could not reasonably be construed as treative.115 Some 
decisions have found it significant that the location of the exam was in an emergency room rather 
than a police station, boosting the medical purpose.116 Other factors that have sometimes been 
influential in swinging the determination toward finding a testimonial purpose have on rare 
occasion included: 
--the signing of a consent form (preceding the interview) that disclosed the law 
enforcement aspects of the examination; 
--the victim’s awareness of the law enforcement functions of the SANE, DOVE, or 
SART members doing the interviewing; or  
kinds of statements made to SANEs. State v. Simmons, 2013 WL 1858929 (Ohio 2013) parses into part a rape 
victim’s statements under the hearsay exception for statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment to 
identify those that relate to treatment and those that do not, but did not find it necessary to do so for 
confrontation purposes because the victim testified. 
113 Compare Hartsfield v. Commonwealth, 277 S.W.3d 239 (SANE’s testimony recounting victim’s statements 
inadmissible because SANE’s are agents of the police for collecting evidence; thus purpose not medical treatment) 
with State v. Lee, No. 22262 2005 WL 544837 (March 5. 2005 Ohio Ct. App.), aff’d 856 N.E.2d 921 (Ohio 2006) 
(SANE’s recounting of similar victim statement admissible: SANEs are medical practitioners, not law enforcement 
officers; purpose thus medical treatment, not trial testimony). See also Herrera v. State, 424 S.W.3d 52 (Tex. 2014) 
(citing cases from various jurisdictions on both sides of the conflict of constitutional authority concerning victim 
statements to SANEs); Williams v. State, 2014 WL 895506 (Ct. App. Texas 2014) (victim’s statement to SANE 
recounting the rape, injuries, and identity of rapist is constitutionally admissible because the overall purpose was 
medical). 
 
114 E.g., State v. Bennington, 264 P.3d 440 (2011) (presence of law enforcement officer dispositive); State v. 
Hopper, 176 P.3d 911 (Idaho 2007) (somewhat semble); State v. Avila, 324 P.3d 342 (Kan. 2014) (mentioning that 
police presence at a SANE interview could make a difference). 
 
  
115 See, e.g., State v. Romero, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (the lengthy time between assault and the SANE 
exam militates against medical purpose) 
 
116 See, e.g., Michigan v. Garland, 777 N.W.2d 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). The theory here is that Bryant stated that 
location is one of the important factors in the totality of the circumstances computation. 
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--close consultation between the SANE and the police or prosecution on particular 
matters or tests concerning the  specific individual patient.  
However, most cases make a determination as to the  testimoniality of the statements 
based on a general characterization of the functions  of SANEs, DOVEs and SARTs generally, 
without much attention to these kinds of details. 
(d) The “Targeting” Issue. 
The resolution of this issue in theory depends upon whether the identity of the assaulter is 
known or suspected at the time of the statement to the SANE. Was it an unknown stranger? Or 
an acquaintance or relative? A question of how focused the investigation is on a particular person 
is similar to that above concerning little Janie’s statements. The cases by and large have not 
discussed this. 
(e) The Expert Testimony Issue. 
The issue here is similar to the issue above under the Janie hypothetical.  California has 
apparently picked up on the fact that Justice Thomas’ formality/solemnity view carried the day in 
Williams, as recounted supra,117 and, citing other California cases relying on the 
formality/solemnity theory, has approved the admission of an informal, internal report of a 
SART team.118 
Conclusion: The Troublesome Ambiguities in Supreme Court Confrontation 
Jurisprudence Which Ohio v. Clark Needs to Clear Up 
The difficulty in these victims’ and children’s statements treated in the above two 
hypotheticals is in considerable measure due to the fact that the Supreme Court in its 
Confrontation jurisprudence (as spawned by Crawford, Davis, and Bryant) has been less than 
definitive about:  
(a) What makes a purpose “primary” when there are mixed purposes?  
(b) In determining purpose, what exactly is the dichotomy the Supreme Court has drawn 
between a purpose to “gather evidence of past fact” and a purpose to “resolve an 
emergency”? On which side of the line is preventing further abuse--say protecting a child 
or siblings from a parent by gathering evidence potentially usable in removal-of-the- 
child-from-the-home proceedings or preventing visitation or other contact? 119 
117 Cite to supra. 
118 People v. Perez, 2013 WL 6795389 (Ct. App. Sixth Dist. Cal. 2013). 
119 The non-testimonial purpose to “resolve an on-going emergency” side of the dichotomy, first articulated in 
Davis in connection with a 911 call, has been expanded time-wise by Bryant to include averting a threat to the 
public, e.g. apprehending an at-large violent criminal. Conceptually, there is a spectrum of purposes that stretches 
from stopping an immediate threat transpiring while the statement is being made (a clearly non-testimonial 
purpose) to convicting and putting a criminal behind bars, which is in some sense stopping a continuing threat to 
the public, but has been declared by the Court to be clearly testimonial.  Thus, one end point of the spectrum is 
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(c) Whose purpose—declarant or questioner—is the most significant when the purpose of 
 each is materially different?  
(d) What exactly is meant when the Supreme Court says the purpose is to be determined 
“objectively” from the standpoint of the reasonable person in the same circumstances? 
(i) Are we to consider the objective questioner, or the objective declarant?   
(ii) How much of the particular circumstances, experiences, sophistication, etc., of 
each are to be taken into account? Or, if it is an outside observer, again, an 
observer with what experience, sophistication, and other characteristics? 
(iii) Is an objective child different from an objective adult? 
(iv) Will an actual, express purpose, say to legally implicate somebody, or to 
obtain medical treatment, prevail over a presumed “objectively appearing”” 
purpose? 
(e) Should a statement be broken into parts when applying the primary purpose test, so 
that scrutiny of the purpose of each segment of a statement is necessary?120 
 (f) Before there can be a Confrontation issue, is a connection to law enforcement or 
government required on the part of the person to whom the statement is made,121 and, if 
so, which is it, and how substantial a connection? For example, would an obligation to 
report child abuse be enough? Would it be enough that police often refer victims to this 
professional for treatment? Is there an independent requirement of such connection, or is 
the connection significant only to determining the purpose of the exchange? Is a 
connection with a non-law-enforcement part of the government (as, e.g., a state social 
worker) distinguishable from a connection to law enforcement? 
 (g) Does a different test of purpose apply if the statement is made to someone who is not 
connected with law enforcement (assuming law enforcement connection is not an 
non-testimonial, the other is testimonial.  The difference seems to be in the immediacy of the threat, time-wise, 
and whether prosecution is the way the threat is to be stopped. There is a vast spectrum between the end points, 
however, and just when the threat that is being averted is close enough in time to the statement to say it is non-
testimonial, is uncertain.  
120 Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Court in Bryant, does seem to recognize that the purpose and the nature of 
an interview as testimonial or non-testimonial can change as the interview progresses. But this is dictum. 
121 Justice Scalia (the author of the Supreme Court’s Crawford opinion) indirectly indicates the answer is “no” in his 
dissent in Bryant, by relying on King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 200, 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 202-03 (K.B. 1799) in which the 
court rejected a hearsay statement by a child to her mother (a private person) after the child was sexually 
assaulted, offered in evidence against the accused assaulter. A similar “no” answer is at least suggested by the fact 
that Crawford expressed approval of the result (though overruled the rationale) of Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 
(1990), which excluded pursuant to the Confrontation Clause a statement of a child about the child’s molestation 
made to a private pediatrician. See Paul Rothstein, Myrna Raeder, and David Crump, EVIDENCE: CASES, MATERIALS 
AND PROBLEMS 612 (4TH Ed. 2013); Richard D. Friedman, Grappling With The Meaning of “Testimonial”, 71 BROOK. 
L. REV. 241, 259-60 (2005) (the confrontation right was recognized before government agents became involved, 
i.e., when criminal prosecutions were primarily privately done).   
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absolute requirement)? Does a different test apply if the recipient is not connected with 
government in any way?122 
 (h) Can volunteered statements without questioning or interrogation violate the 
Confrontation   Clause? 
Additional complexities have been introduced by the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Illinois where no majority of justices lined up behind any of the competing views of 
the Confrontation Clause expressed by any of the justices, and a decision was reached only 
because two different views of the Confrontation Clause accidentally pointed to the same result 
on the particular facts. The difficulties posed for our problem specifically by Williams are:  
(i) Under what circumstances, if any, can expert testimony relying on the child’s or 
victim’s statement circumvent the applicability of the Confrontation Clause to the 
statement?  
(ii) Under what circumstances, if any, is a statement made before police suspect a 
particular person subject to the Confrontation Clause? 
(iii) Does the formality of the child’s or adult victim’s statement make a difference 
(and if so, what is meant by formality)? 123 
The Georgetown Law Library has supplied me with every state and federal case involving 
our two classes of statements124 decided in the last four years. My conclusion is that the cases are 
in hopeless disarray and quite inconsistent with one another.125 This state of affairs can only be 
corrected if the Supreme Court clarifies its Confrontation jurisprudence. Ohio v. Clark provides 
the Justices with an opportunity to do just that.  Let us hope they take the opportunity.  
My tentative prediction is the Court will rule on the above issues in a way that will narrow 
the scope of the Confrontation Clause, because a majority of the Justices feel they have painted 
themselves into a corner in their Confrontation jurisprudence so far and are looking for a way out. 
They feel that carrying out the full implications of Crawford has proven to have some unacceptable 
results in terms of an adverse effect on law enforcement.126 In particular, if Clark were to affirm 
122 Cf. dissent in state decision of Ohio v. Clark suggesting a different variety of “purpose” test should apply where 
the child’s statement is to a pre-school teacher than applied in Crawford, Davis, and Bryant where the declarant’s 
statements were to police. Cite page. 
123 The California courts have made “formality” a nearly dispositive factor. See, citing California cases, People v. 
Perez, 2013 WL 6795389 (Ct. App. Sixth Dist. Cal. 2013). 
124 I.e., the two classes that are the subject of this paper, set forth in the Introduction, supra, and that are the basis 
of our two hypotheticals. 
125 For just one example among many, Compare Hartsfield v. Commonwealth, 277 S.W.3d 239 (SANE’s recounting 
victim’s statements inadmissible because SANE’s are agents of the police for collecting evidence; thus purpose not 
medical treatment) with State v. Lee, No. 22262 2005 WL 544837 (March 5. 2005 Ohio Ct. App.), aff’d 856 N.E.2d 
921 (Ohio 2006) (SANE’s recounting of similar victim statement admissible: SANEs are medical practitioners, not 
law enforcement officers; purpose thus medical treatment, not trial testimony). 
126 This is more fully spelled out in Rothstein, Unwrapping the Box the Supreme Court Justices Have 
Gotten Themselves Into: Internal Confrontations  Over Confronting the Confrontation 
Clause….(Cite) 
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the lower court’s decision in Clark that the teacher’s duty to report child abuse brings the child’s 
statement to her within the Confrontation clause, this would outlaw a broad range of prosecution 
evidence, rendering inadmissible not only many statements to teachers, but also to doctors, welfare 
workers, nurses, hospital personnel, and others--statements which I think the Court will feel are 
needed for successful prosecution in the many cases where the victim cannot or will not testify.  
In other words, I think the following passage from the dissent in the lower court decision 
of Clark will have traction in the U.S. Supreme Court:  
[T]he majority [by holding the teacher’s duty to report makes the child’s statement 
testimonial and inadmissible] creates a beneficial catch-22 for pedophiles and other 
abusers of children. The very people who have the expertise and opportunity to recognize 
child abuse are now prohibited. . . from testifying about any out-of-court statements that a 
child makes about abuse or neglect when the child, for whatever reason, is unable to 
testify. Child abusers often evade prosecution because the victims are unable to disclose 
the abuse, let alone testify. [Our child-hearsay exception] which applies only when the 
child victim’s testimony is not reasonably obtainable, sought to ameliorate the difficulty 
in securing prosecutions in these difficult cases. Under the majority’s rule, if a child 
victim of abuse is not able to testify, a mandatory reporter’s testimony regarding the 
child’s out-of-court statements about the abuse is barred by the Confrontation Clause.127  
. . . . 
The majority reaches an illogical result, the straightforward application of which dictates 
that when a teacher notices that a child is hungry and asks whether the child had 
breakfast, the teacher is a police interrogator because the child might disclose reportable 
neglect. When a licensed psychologist questions a child about insomnia, the majority 
would conclude, the psychologist is a police interrogator because the child might disclose 
reportable abuse. When a dentist observes an injury in a child’s mouth and asks the child 
“what happened,” under the majority holding, the dentist is an agent of law enforcement 
for Confrontation Clause purposes. Common sense dictates that those conclusions are 
incorrect.128 
 
 
 
#  #  # 
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